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Prelude 
In 2006, I met with a returnee in Prijedor, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH).  He and his family had fled from 
the country during the 1992-1995 war. After spending eight years overseas, he returned to his 
hometown in 2000.  In 2005-2006, he was involved in efforts to establish a memorial at Omarska mine 
complex just outside of Prijedor, after Mittal Steel purchased a 51% majority ownership of the mine.  
The complex has a sordid history. In the summer of 1992, the mine and two other sites in Keraterm and 
Trnopolje were transformed into Bosnian Serb-administered concentration camps.  Bosniaks (Bosnian 
Muslims), Bosnian Croats and other non-Serbs were detained in horrendous, inhumane conditions, with 
regular exposure to killings, torture, rape, beatings and humiliation.  The camps formed part of the 
policy of ethnic cleansing, the term used to describe “the elimination by the dominant ethnic group of a 
given territory of members of other ethnic groups within that territory” (UN, 1995, pp. 65-66). 
Negotiations to establish a memorial, desired by many camp survivors and others affected by the war, 
involved a series of face-to-face individual and group meetings in Prijedor.  These sessions were 
mediated by an external non-governmental organisation and included survivors, people associated with 
the mine – including a former mine manager, young Bosniaks and Bosnian-Serbs, politicians and various 
other community members.  Ultimately, a rough consensus was reached and plans to erect a memorial 
were formally announced in national and international media.  The mayor of Prijedor, however, 
remained opposed to such plans throughout the process. Further, opposition emerged from members of 
the Bosniak diaspora, many of whom are also survivors of the camps. They critiqued what they 
perceived to be the non-transparent nature of the process to date and circulated an online petition 
opposing the plans, which received approximately 1,200 signatures.  Wary of such opposition, Mittal 
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Steel put the memorial on hold.  Despite subsequent efforts by the diaspora and others in BiH to re-start 
negotiations, there has been little movement and the establishment of a memorial remains unfulfilled. 
The following year, in 2007, I worked at the War Crimes Chamber at the State Court of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, on a case that involved the prosecution of the chief of the Omarska camp and a shift 
leader.  Trial dates and the ordering of witnesses were often based on and adjusted in order to 
accommodate the schedules of members of the Bosnian diaspora from around the world, travelling to 
Sarajevo to serve as witnesses.  Their testimonies contributed to the gathering of evidence and to the 
narrative that emerged from the trial.  The participation of these witnesses and survivors in the trials 
also had the potential to benefit their own individual healing and process of personal reconciliation. 
Rationale for this paper 
These brief anecdotes indicate the important role that diaspora communities can play in transitional 
justice and reconciliation processes.  Transitional justice seeks to address a legacy of large-scale past 
abuses, and includes mechanisms such as criminal trials, truth commissions, memorials and reparations. 
When effectively designed to include the disapora, such initiatives can also contribute to addressing the 
needs of communities outside of the home country.   However, there has been limited consideration of 
the participation of the diaspora in transitional justice and reconciliation processes.   
 
Much of the literature on diasporas and conflict focuses on their role in fueling conflict in the homeland 
and as a spoiler of peace processes (Cochrane, Baser and Swain, 2009; Cochrane, 2007).  A number of 
studies, including a well-cited study by Collier and Hoeffler (2000), have focused on the funding of rebel 
organisations by diasporas and their role in supporting insurgencies (Lyons, 2004). Beyond the provision 
of financial support, diasporas may also contribute to framing the debate around issues of conflict and 
identity.  Benedict Anderson coined the term ‘long-distance nationalists’ to indicate the political 
irresponsibility of diaspora groups in exacerbating identity politics in the homeland and endorsing 
ethnicist, nationalistic and exclusionary movements without having to directly experience the 
repercussions (Anderson, cited in Cochrane, Baser and Swain, 2009; Werbner, cited in Lyons, 2004; 
Mohamoud, 2005). 
More recently, there has been emerging research on and recognition of the positive role that diasporas 
could play instead in conflict situations as peacebuilders (Sinatti et al., 2010; Cochrane, Baser and Swain, 
2009). The focus however, has primarily been on the growing importance of diaspora groups to 
development in the homeland through remittances (flows of funds from diasporas to their home 
countries) and investment in economic activities.  Remittances have been sent in the billions of dollars 
over the decades.  Alongside investments, they can help to promote economic recovery and contribute 
to the foundation for sustainable peace (Swain and Phan, 2012, pp. 165-166).  Beyond the provision of 
support to economic recovery, there has been limited research on other potentially positive roles that 
diasporas can play in the aftermath of violence and large-scale abuses. 
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This paper is a preliminary exploration of the role that diaspora communities can play in transitional 
justice and processes of reconciliation.  The aim is to consider what potential there is for tapping into 
diaspora communities and the possible benefits this could have on diasporas themselves and on 
peacebuilding processes in the homeland.  The goal is also to explore and reflect on ways in which 
reconciliatory attitudes can be encouraged among diaspora communities, as well as their participation 
in transnational activities. 
The paper begins by providing a brief overview of diasporas, followed by a discussion on relationships 
and attitudes within conflict-generated diaspora communities in the aftermath of violence.  The paper 
then explores the various roles that diasporas can play in transitional justice, such as providing input to 
strategies and participating in established mechanisms; or mobilizing on their own to push for 
transitional justice measures.  This is followed by a brief look at diaspora involvement in other processes 
of reconciliation, including dialogue and media initiatives.  The paper then discusses how integration 
policies and outcomes in the hostland can influence the views of diasporas and their involvement with 
the homeland.   The paper concludes with challenges related to diaspora participation and some overall 
reflections. 
The terms ‘homeland’ and ‘hostland’, ‘home’ country and ‘host’ country, commonly used in the 
literature on diaspora and transnational migration, will be used in this paper to connote the country of 
origin and the country of destination, respectively.  It is important to recognise, however, that such 
home/host dichotomies can be problematic as they assume a set linearity in migration processes.  In 
actuality, ‘home’ is not fixed for diasporas and the ‘host’ country is in many cases not a transitory place.  
Rather, one’s home and one’s definition of ‘home’ can be adapted over time and can shift along with 
notions of belonging and identity (Mišković, 2011; Hoehne et al., 2010; Smith, 2007). 
Diaspora as transnational communities 
Diaspora communities are formed from migration, stemming from various circumstances.  These include 
violent conflict, natural disaster, situations of poverty in the country of origin and economic opportunity 
abroad.  Migration, however, whether forced or voluntary, does not automatically result in diaspora 
formation.  A critical component of the diaspora is the maintenance of an attachment to the country of 
origin regardless of length of time outside of the country (Swain and Phan, 2012, p. 161-163; Hoehne, 
Feyissa, Abdile, and Schmitz-Pranghe, 2010, p. 2).  Diaspora identities are thus not confined to the 
nation state, but are “inherently hybrid in character” (Vimalarajah and Cheran, 2010, p. 11).   
This paper focuses on conflict-generated diaspora, formed through forced migration.   They comprise of 
individuals and families who have fled their home country as a result of large-scale violence and abuses, 
and scatter and remain in various other countries initially as refugees or asylum seekers.  Their identities 
are shaped by the societies from which they have come, the new societies to which they have migrated, 
and their experience of conflict and flight (Van Hear, 2009, p. 183).  Their experiences imbue them with 
a “sense of collective trauma” (Suntha, 2011, p. 9).  The maintenance of “cultural memory” and distinct 
local identities can form the basis of diaspora consciousness and the basis for social ties across borders 
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and connection with homeland (Halilovich, 2011).  Migrants who left voluntarily may also suffer from 
violence and war, through loss of loved ones, property and investments (Young and Park, 2009) and 
concern for their homeland. 
Migrants, whether forced or voluntary, often engage in transnational behaviours and activities.  The 
attachment of diaspora communities to their homeland can result in return visits and simultaneous 
investment, socially, economically and/or politically in more than one society (Antwi-Boateng, 2011; 
Ramet and Valenta, 2011).  The range of potential transnational activities is extensive:   
They may include activities that are political (for example, lobbying), economic (for 
example, remittances and investment), social (such as, promotion of the human and 
other rights of the transnational group within different societies) and cultural (for 
example, articles in newspapers). They may take place at the individual level (through 
family networks), or through institutional channels (such as, through community or 
international organizations) (Al-Ali, Black, and Koser, 2001, p. 581) 
 Advancements in communications, transport and finance have greatly improved the ability of diasporas 
to maintain links and to contribute to their country of origin (Swain and Phan, 2012).  The willingness 
and ability of diaspora communities to engage in transnational activities often depends, however, on the 
skills and resources available to them, which can be influenced by the opportunities in the country of 
destination.  They can also be influenced by the internal organisation and cohesion of diaspora 
communities (Al-Ali et al., 2001, p. 581).   
It is important to remember that there can be a high level of diversity within the diaspora and within 
specific diaspora communities.  The Bosnian community in Melbourne, Australia, are not preoccupied 
with ethnic exclusivity and nationalistic patriotism, which continues to play a divisive role in their 
homeland and among other diasporas.  The associations that they have established include all members 
of Bosnian ethnic groups (Halilovich, 2011).  In contrast, associations in Norway were perceived to be 
ethnically exclusive and the persistence of inter-ethnic tensions undermined inter-group cohesion 
(Valenta and Strabac, 2011a).  Even within one hostland, diaspora attitudes can differ.  Orjuela (2008) 
finds that despite divisions between Tamils and Sinhalese in Sri Lankan diaspora communities in 
Australia and Canada, there are people who maintain friendships across ethnic divides and share 
commonalities with fellow Sri Lankans regardless of ethnic identity.   
It thus cannot be assumed that members of the diaspora or a particular community share similar 
perspectives on homeland politics or intergroup relationships; or share similar loyalties toward the 
homeland and engage with the home country to the same degree.  Other identities and experiences, 
such as class, gender, age, generation, urban or rural background, level of education and occupation, 
date of departure from the home country, and specific location of origin within the country, can 
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segment diasporas and influence their perspectives and level of transnationalism (Hoehne et al., 2010; 
Orjuela, 2008; Mey, 2008; Spear, 2006).2    
Diaspora community relations 
Violent conflicts are massive traumatic events that result in the breakdown of societal structures and 
networks of relationships that provide the basis for a functioning community. States of terror and 
collective fear are created through indiscriminate violence that penetrates all levels of society. In 
contemporary wars, much of this violence is perpetuated in the immediate communal environment—
pitting communities against communities, neighbours against neighbours and friends against friends 
(Fletcher and Weinstein, 2002). People begin to turn increasingly to their own identity group for 
psychological safety; and distrust of the other group results in the gradual demise of intergroup 
friendships and communal networks (Halpern and Weinstein, 2004; Bar-Tal, Halperin and de Rivera, 
2007).  
 
Addressing societal divisions in the aftermath of violent conflict is often one of the most challenging yet 
necessary aspects of recovery.  Attention, however, has primarily been placed on those remaining in the 
homeland and on returnees to the area.3  There is little attention to the relationships among conflict-
generated refugees/diasporas that remain in their host country.  In some cases these relationships may 
similarly suffer from the strain of divisions and residual hostilities, which also needs to be addressed.  
Mohamoud (2005) finds, for example, that some African diaspora groups in the Netherlands “reproduce 
and sometimes multiply the social and political fragmentation and other particularised cleavages 
existing in the homeland” (p. 26).  In Britain, the Bosnian diaspora were divided in many respects, with 
little sense of community (Kelly, 2003). Steinberg (2010) finds low levels of trust among the Liberian 
community in New York City; people were not sure who their neighbours were or what they may have 
done and were afraid of being hurt by them.   
 
Diaspora attitudes may even be more hardened and communities more divided than in the homeland.  
While views of the conflict in Sri Lanka are just as incompatible among Tamils and Sinhalese in London as 
in the home country, Tamil-Sinahalese relations have been said to be more segregated and polarized in 
London (Orjueala, 2008).  As noted, diasporas may be more prone to support divisive, exclusionary, 
                                                            
2 It is important to note that the views and relationships among particular diaspora communities can also diverge 
from those held by populations in the homeland due to differing demographics of groups in the homeland and 
groups in the diaspora.  In addition, perspectives and relationship of those living in the home country can also vary, 
similar to within the diaspora.  
3 The UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) has engaged in efforts to improve intergroup relations in areas with high levels 
of returnees, for example, through their Imagine Coexistence project launched in parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
and Rwanda in 2000.  This involved the funding of activities catered to interaction and collaboration between 
different ethnic groups. 
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nationalistic movements, without having to suffer from the potential consequences in the homeland 
(Mohamoud, 2005; Werbner, cited in Lyons, 2004). 
 
In other cases, diaspora communities may be less divided and they may harbor more reconciliatory 
views of the other.  Hall (2011) finds in his study of Bosnian diaspora in Sweden that many of the factors 
that contribute to insecurity and the persistence of a conflict ethos in BiH are simply absent in Sweden.  
Being in a different country provides “the ability to exist outside of the social-psychological 
infrastructure created by war” (p. 12).  In Malmö, Sweden for example, Bosnian children of Serbian, 
Croatian or Muslim background attend school together and play together (Slavnić, 2011).  This is in 
contrast to the prevalence of divided schools in Bosnia and Herzegovina (see Sivac-Bryant, 2008) and the 
lack of exposure that young people have to the other.    
 
Living in a different environment may also challenge conflict identities.  Diasporas from the same 
homeland may find overarching commonalities that supersede parochial identities, based on their 
shared culture and the similar challenges they face in terms of integration in a new society (Slavnić, 
2011).  Exposure to other cultures and nationalities could also result in diasporas ascribing less 
importance to particular identities.  Hall and Kostić (2009) find that Bosnian diasporas in Sweden who 
expressed higher socio-cultural identification with natives were more positive about multiculturalism in 
their homeland and placed less emphasis on ethnic identities. 
 
Diasporas may also develop more reconciliatory views due to exposure to different norms and 
perspectives in the hostland (Spear, 2006).  Antwi-Boateng (2011) finds that U.S.-based Liberian 
diaspora, for example, considered the adoption of non-violent means in the civil rights movements in 
the U.S. and subsequent progress in race relations to be a useful model to draw upon for reconciliation 
in Liberia.  Norms of tolerance, diversity and rule of law were also considered to be attractive and 
worthy of adoption and promotion in the homeland.  Alternative social spaces for dialogue in the 
hostlands can also allow diasporas to challenge conventional politics and divisive attitudes in the 
homeland, and to set new agendas and solutions (Hoene et al., 2010). 
 
Regardless of the condition of relationships in diaspora communities, the various outcomes still point to 
the importance of engaging with the diaspora.  In cases where diasporas harbor nationalist, exclusionary 
attitudes and where communities are divided, interventions aimed at addressing the legacy of violence 
and improving social relations are important.  In cases where diasporas have reconciliatory attitudes, it 
could be beneficial to tap into these groups and encourage them to participate in initiatives to promote 
peaceful relations in the homeland.  
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Diaspora participation in transitional justice  
 
The United Nations defines transitional justice as the “full range of processes and mechanisms 
associated with a society’s attempts to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order 
to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation” (UN Security Council, 2004, p.4). 
These are seen to include judicial and non-judicial mechanisms, primarily individual prosecutions, truth-
seeking, reparations, institutional reform, vetting and memorializing.  A recent review of transitional 
justice literature finds that reconciliation is considered to be the “ultimate goal” of transitional justice, 
with the view that reconciliation is essential to preventing a renewal of conflict and ensuring the process 
of democratization (Oduro, 2007, pp. 2-3). 
 
The term reconciliation is frequently used by academics and practitioners. There is limited consensus, 
however, on what reconciliation entails and how it should be promoted. The IDEA handbook on 
reconciliation defines it as “a process through which a society moves from a divided past to a shared 
future” (Bloomfield, 2003, p. 12).  For some, reconciliation is about justice in its many forms.4 For others, 
reconciliation is about truth-telling and coming to a shared view of the past. Others believe instead that 
reconciliation is about apology and forgiveness. More commonly, and from a transformative 
peacebuilding perspective, reconciliation may be seen as the process of repairing relationships and 
societies at all levels and confronting dominant narratives of the past (see Rodicio, 2001, p. 131). This 
may entail psychological interventions at the individual level in order to address war trauma. At the 
interpersonal level, reconciliation involves restoring intimate relationships between old friends. At the 
community level, reconciliation has been identified with efforts to promote intergroup relationships and 
to challenge stereotypes and perceptions of the ‘other’ and of one’s own group. The development of 
common civic goals and collective civic action are considered important at the societal level. At the 
wider political level, reconciliation has been associated with efforts to foster representative institutions, 
commitment to the rule of law, positive state-citizen relations and nation building (Barsalou, 2005; 
Chapman, 2009; Halpern and Weinstein, 2004). 
 
Methods of diaspora participation 
Transitional justice mechanisms to date have primarily focused on institutions within national borders 
and have been limited in their outreach to populations outside of the homeland (Rimmer, 2010).  As 
such, the needs of diaspora communities and their potential as actors in the transitional justice process 
have not yet been fulfilled (Mey, 2008).  There has in recent years, however, been some limited 
recognition of the importance of involving diasporas in transitional justice. 
 
One way in which refugee and diaspora communities have been involved is in providing input to 
transitional justice strategies.  The Kenyan Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission, for example, 
                                                            
4 This may include retributive, distributive, procedural and restorative justice.  
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conducted interviews in 2011 with refugees in camps in Uganda to determine how refugee communities 
that fled the electoral violence in 2007 could be included in transitional justice processes (Lyodu, 2011).  
Zimbabweans in Europe are also being  approached by the Zimbabwe Human Rights non-governmental 
organisation Forum for input on transitional justice (Marks, 2010).  In addition, the Iraqi community in 
the U.S. was particularly involved in setting up the Iraqi Special Tribunal (Mey, 2008).   
 
Transitional justice mechanisms have in a couple of unique instances specifically incorporated refugee 
and diaspora communities in their design and implementation.  Truth commissions in East Timor and 
Sierra Leone included programmes to engage refugees in neighbouring countries.  The final report of the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Sierra Leone included 175 statements from refugees (Young and 
Park, 2009, p. 349). 
 
The most comprehensive effort to date to involve diasporas in all aspects of a transitional justice 
mechanism is the Liberian Truth and Reconciliation Commission (LTRC).  Recognising that the Liberian 
diaspora played a role in starting the civil war and that key witnesses, alleged perpetrators and other 
conflict actors, were known to be among the diaspora, the LTRC was mandated to include the Liberian 
diaspora in its activities (Antwi-Boateng, 2011; Young and Park, 2009).  This resulted in a series of public 
hearings held in cities overseas with a strong Liberian diaspora presence. 
 
Diaspora communities themselves have also mobilized to initiate transitional justice initiatives or to 
further ongoing processes.  The Haitian diaspora community effectively pushed in the 1990s for the 
truth commission for Haiti (the Commission nationale de vérité et de justice).  They created a proposal 
outlining the parameters for the Commission’s activities and lobbied for its implementation.  Once in 
place, the diaspora participated from abroad, sending written accounts and in some cases coming to 
testify before the Commission (Quinn, 2009).  The Iraqi community in the U.S. also mobilized and was 
particularly involved in civil society initiatives to establish victims’ reparations programmes (Mey, 2008).   
 
Another way that diasporas have been active is by pushing for justice through universal jurisdiction.  
Universal jurisdiction legislation in various countries in Europe has provided the possibility of 
prosecution for serious human rights violations committed anywhere in the world, particularly where 
the home country justice system is unable or unwilling to prosecute.  Chilean and Argentinean diaspora 
communities have relied on universal jurisdiction in attempts to have criminals arrested while travelling 
through Europe and tried. Rwandan diaspora in France have formed the Association of Rwandan 
Victims, whose primary purpose is to bring lawsuits against criminals currently in France.  Cambodian 
diaspora in Belgium and France have also mobilized and brought suits against the Khmer Rouge before 
Belgian and French national courts (Mey, 2008). 
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Potential benefits of diaspora participation 
There are various potential benefits to engaging diasporas in transitional justice.  These include diversity 
of perspectives; more comprehensive truth gathering; greater international awareness; and the 
potential for addressing societal divisions within diaspora communities.   
 
Surveying a range of perspectives is important to designing and developing transitional justice processes 
and mechanisms that meet the needs of the diverse populations affected by violent conflict.  Diasporas 
may have different yet meaningful needs that should be expressed in the formulation of policies and in 
the operation of transitional justice mechanisms.  They may, for example, have very different views on 
restitution for the loss of property from displacement than those remaining in the home country.  Young 
and Park (2009) emphasise in the case of the Liberian truth commission the importance of considering 
both perspectives in light of the eventual reparations process.  Abdulkadir and Abdulkadir (2011) find 
that Somalian diaspora communities often have different views on transition. It is necessary to 
document their opinions on how to address the legacy of mass atrocities from the ongoing civil war in 
order to design a process that can have meaning for a broader segment of the scattered Somalian 
population.   
 
Additionally, the act of listening to and incorporating the voices of diasporas and refugees who were 
forced to flee their home country can be beneficial in terms of psychological healing.  Lyodu (2011) finds 
that the solicitation of refugee perspectives and concerns by the Kenyan Commission had positive 
psychological effects as refugees no longer felt that they had been forgotten. 
 
The participation of diasporas in transitional justice mechanisms can also contribute to more 
comprehensive gathering of evidence and truth-telling, contributing to greater effectiveness of such 
initiatives.  In the case of trials, diasporas have comprised a significant number of witnesses in 
international criminal tribunals and in national courts in the homeland, such as the War Crimes Chamber 
in the State Court of BiH – providing testimony and essential evidence.  Cases tried against the Khmer 
Rouge before Belgian and French national courts, under universal jurisdiction, have contributed to the 
collection of evidence that could also be relied upon at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of 
Cambodia, set up for prosecution of the Khmer Rouge regime (Mey, 2008).  Additionally, in situations of 
persistent tensions in politicised home countries, it may be safer for diasporas to testify than survivors 
living within the country.   
 
In the case of truth commissions, the Liberian truth commission took and included statements from 
Liberians in 11 U.S. cities, the UK and the Buduburam refugee settlement in Ghana (Young and Park, 
2009, pp. 345-346).  The assumption was that this would provide a more comprehensive understanding 
and narrative of the civil war, particularly as the U.S. diaspora were viewed as having played a key role in 
the war (Young and Park, 2009; Steinberg, 2010).  Many Liberians not only in Liberia but among the 
diaspora participated in the Commission process with the hope that it would assist them in gathering 
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information about the whereabouts of their lost relatives or the circumstances of their deaths (Young 
and Park, 2009). 
 
Diasporas can also play an active role in outreach and awareness-raising in their host country.  The mere 
involvement of diasporas around the world can garner greater media attention and raise awareness in 
host countries of transitional justice processes and mechanisms and situations in the homeland.  Young 
and Park (2009) state that without the diaspora component, the Liberian commission would not have 
received the level of coverage in mainstream U.S. media as it did.  The high-profile Pinochet case in 
Europe filed under universal jurisdiction legislation, garnered interest not only among Chilean diaspora 
but other populations in Europe (Mey, 2008). 
 
Transitional justice processes and mechanisms that incorporate diasporas may also have the added 
benefit of highlighting and addressing divisions and trauma in diaspora communities. The Liberian truth 
commission revealed the divisions and residual hostilities and tensions present in many diaspora 
communities.  Further, the final commission report formally documented the need for community 
reconciliation initiatives to be implemented among the diaspora. This recommendation has propelled 
the development of such programming (Young and Park, 2009).  The Commission’s outreach events in 
the U.S. also contributed to the initiation of dialogue amongst divided Liberian diasporas.   Some were 
brought together for the first time since the war.  Such engagement allowed for dialogue on a range of 
issues affecting diaspora communities, such as the ongoing effects of trauma, refugee and immigration 
policies, and ways in which reconciliation could proceed in a diaspora setting (Young and Park, 2009).   
Antwi-Boateng (2011) argues that the involvement of Liberian disaporas also encouraged reconciliation 
processes in the homeland.  Their participation in the commission's programmes, including the 
attendance of key leaders of a U.S.-based diaspora organisation at a major conference on reconciliation 
in Liberia organised by the LTRC, had the potential to validate the commission process and improve the 
prospects for reconciliation. 
 
Diaspora participation in reconciliation-oriented and peacebuilding initiatives 
 
Diaspora communities have engaged in various other transnational activities aimed more explicitly at 
processes of reconciliation and peacebuilding among themselves and in the homeland.  Such activities 
have the potential to improve relationships within diaspora communities and to transform diasporas 
into sources of peacebuilding.  Initiatives have extended beyond remittances and economic investments 
and have included dialogue; media initiatives; and support for civil society organisations working in 
reconciliation and peacebuilding.  
 
Various non-governmental organisations in hostland countries have initiated dialogue initiatives in order 
to challenge divisions and polarization between identity groups in diaspora communities.  Australian and 
Canadian Sri Lankan NGOs have engaged both Tamils and Sinhalese, for example, in discussions of the 
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war and prospects for peace.  The Berghof Foundation, an international NGO, has also facilitated 
connections between the diaspora members and the homeland, organizing study tours such that 
diaspora can learn about the situation in Sri Lanka and build links with local groups.  The short time-
frame afforded to many of these initiatives, however, makes it difficult to generate significant and 
sustained peace-oriented attitudinal and behavioural changes (Orjuela, 2008). 
 
More extended dialogue measures have been implemented with Ethiopian conflict-generated diaspora 
in the U.S.  The Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, based at George Mason University, 
facilitated sustained dialogue among Ethiopian diasporas from 1999 to 2003 with the goal of addressing 
protracted social conflict and rebuilding and transforming relationships.  An extensive series of small 
group meetings and workshops were held, which contributed to building of trust and relationships 
among diasporas from diverse backgrounds.   The initiative provided a safe space for dialogue on issues 
of identity and eventually on conflict and peace processes in the homeland.  It allowed for the 
recognition of shared interests in promoting sustainable peace (Lyons, 2004).  
 
Media initiatives are another way in which conflictual relationships among diaspora could be addressed 
and way through which reconciliatory and peace-oriented diaspora attitudes can be transmitted to the 
homeland.  Diaspora-produced films, books, articles, music and other cultural expressions can help to 
counter negative impacts of victimhood and contribute to processes of healing (Cheran, 2003).  They can 
play an important role in influencing discourses about violence, conflict and peace; and ideas and 
attitudes held by key actors and ordinary people in the diaspora and country of origin (Orjuela, 2008).   
 
The Ethiopian diaspora community in the U.S., for example, has a range of newspapers, websites, radio 
and television broadcasts that have the potential to influence strategies of key actors in Ethiopia (Lyons, 
2004).  Diaspora-run media is also widely read and listened to in Sri Lanka.  It contributes to framing the 
debate on conflict and peace issues and influencing attitudes and opinions. In addition, reporting on 
diaspora peace initiatives can be symbolically important as they demonstrate the possibility of dialogue 
and alternative views.    There is a risk, however, with all open and participatory media initiatives of 
inflammatory statements on message boards or on the airwaves, which could be destabilizing in some 
circumstances (Antwi-Boateng, 2011).  Sri Lankan diaspora-run media, for example, is often strongly 
polarized (Orjuela, 2008). 
 
Radio programmes with call-in segments and discussions on internet forums have provided space for 
members of the diaspora to engage in dialogue and for moderate voices to challenge extremist 
contributors.  These mediums can link not only disparate diaspora populations but also diasporas with 
those in the homeland.  Popular Liberian radio stations routinely include selected diaspora online news 
journals before opening up their programme to callers from the public.  This allows not only an avenue 
for the infusion of diaspora norms but also a space for those in the homeland to evaluate the relevance 
of such norms for peacebuilding (Antwi-Boateng, 2011).  An NGO, founded by a U.S. based Liberian, has 
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provided grants for the training of community radio staff to diversify programming content and to make 
programmes more interactive, such that the general population can be involved in national dialogue on 
peacebuilding (Antwi-Boateng, 2011).  
 
Diaspora-produced media and literature can also advance truth-telling and awareness-raising among 
populations in the diaspora and homeland and internationally.  The Killing Days, for example is a well-
known book written by a UK-based Bosnian who arrived as a refugee during the 1992-1995 war.  It 
documents his time in the Omarska and Manjaca prison camps.5  Literature and films on the violent 
conflict in Bosnia have provided an outlet for survivors. They have also been used to inform people 
about past events and been relied upon to support evidence in trials. 
 
Diaspora communities can encourage processes of reconciliation and peacebuilding also through the 
support of civil society organisations in the home country.  In the case of Northern Ireland, although 
much attention has been paid to Irish diaspora in the U.S. funding the violence, more money has 
actually been donated by the diaspora toward peace-oriented activities, including donations to the 
International Fund for Ireland.  This fund focuses on cross-community development and reconciliation 
projects in both parts of Ireland, giving priority to initiatives that promote cooperation across the border 
(Cochrane, Baser and Swain, 2009). 
 
Diasporas have also engaged directly in the strengthening of civil society organisations (CSOs) in the 
homeland.  Mohamoud (2005) outlines how diaspora communities from various conflict-affected 
African countries have provided resources and skills and capacity training to CSOs in their countries of 
origin.  Training has been conducted by diaspora themselves. The aim is not only to enhance the 
capacities and structures of civil society networks but also to instill local communities with a civic-
minded and collective mentality that can contribute to the development of social capital and eventually 
social transformation.  The organisations that are emerging are hybrid in nature. They are locally 
developed but imbued in part with ideas, perspectives and knowledge of transnational African diasporas 
(Mahamoud, 2005).   
 
In some cases, governments (national and local level) in the countries of destination have provided 
incentives for diasporas to engage in such activities, providing co-funding for development and 
peacebuilding projects developed by diaspora organisations toward their countries of origin (Sinatti, 
2010). Diaspora organisations have also collaborated with local hostland NGOs, which can facilitate 
funding from the host government.  A Somali diaspora initiative partnered with a Finnish development 
organisation, for example, and received funding from the Finnish Foreign Ministry for their work on local 
level conflict resolution in Somalia (Hoehne et al., 2010). 
 
                                                            
5 Pervanić, K. (1999). The Killing Days: My Journey through the Bosnian War. London: Blake Publishing. 
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Influence of hostland policies and integration on diaspora attitudes and participation  
 
The hostland can influence diaspora involvement in their homeland not only directly through the 
provision of governmental grants for diaspora projects and organisational collaborations but also 
indirectly through their immigration and integration policies (Baser and Swain, 2008; cited in Swain and 
Phan, 2012, p. 176).   Al-Ali et al. (2001) find that the ability of individuals, families and communities in 
the diaspora to become involved in transnational activities depends on the skills and resources available 
to them, which can be dependent on the “opportunity structures in their countries of destination” (p. 
581).  Immigration policies and the degree of integration that forced migrants are able to achieve can 
thus affect their willingness and ability to engage with their country of origin. They can also affect the 
attitudes of refugees/diasporas toward reconciliation processes. 
 
The status of refugees/diasporas 
Immigration policies of host countries are important in terms of creating or hindering the space for 
transnational activities.  Refugees who face uncertainty about their legal status in the host country are 
likely to avoid activities that could jeopardize their status, in particular visits to their home country 
(Valenta and Strabac, 2011b; Kent, 2008; Al-Ali et al., 2001).  This in turn could hinder participation in 
transitional justice activities, such as trials, truth commissions, commemoration events and traditional 
justice ceremonies that take place in the homeland.  Young and Park (2009) highlight that many Liberian 
diasporas who provided information to the Liberian commission would have been unable to participate 
had the commission not held hearings in the U.S. Their U.S. immigration status could have been 
jeopardized had they traveled to Liberia.  
 
Lack of permanent immigration status can limit the ability of diaspora to contribute to processes of 
reconciliation and peacebuilding in the country of origin.  Bosnian diaspora in Germany, for example, 
faced long periods of “suspended animation” due to the uncertainty about their status, which hindered 
their ability to visit BiH (Coughlan, 2011, p. 110). Kent (2008) highlights that only after the threat of 
forced return had lifted did many Bosnian diasporas feel able to visit the homeland and to turn their 
minds to peacebuilding activities there. 
 
The naturalization policies of the homeland can also affect transnational activities, in particular 
participation in elections.  If the home country does not allow for dual citizenship and requires that 
home country citizenship is given up upon naturalization in a foreign country, then diasporas are no 
longer entitled to vote in home elections.  This is relevant here to the extent that should diaspora 
communities harbor more reconciliatory views, they may be more likely to vote for inclusive parties 
rather than nationalist, exclusive politicians and political parties.  Hall (2011) finds for example, that 
Bosniak diaspora can have a peace promoting influence in Bosnia and Herzegovina as they are more 
likely to vote for moderate parties and candidates if on the ballot. 
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Structural integration 
Structural integration refers to incorporation into central societal institutions, such as the labour market, 
language and education (Hall and Kostić, 2009).   Hall and Kostić (2009) based on their study of Bosnian 
diasporas in Sweden, find that greater structural integration can encourage more moderation and 
reconciliatory attitudes among diasporas.  Respondents with higher structural integration expressed less 
social distances to the other and more optimism for coexistence; as well as acknowledgement of past 
suffering of other groups (p. 6).  Such reconciliatory attitudes on the part of diaspora communities in 
turn have the potential to encourage peaceful relations in the homelands through their transitional 
engagements.   
 
Greater structural integration can also facilitate the ability and willingness of disaporas to participate in 
transnational activities.  Attitudes toward engagement with the homeland are strongly qualified by the 
needs and demands of the diaspora themselves (Kent, 2008).  If diasporas are pre-occupied with basic 
survival and with their status in the country, they are much less likely to have the flexibility and 
resources to turn attention to their homeland and to transnational activities.  Eritrean diasporas in 
Germany, for example, have struggled in the labour market, which has undermined their ability to 
return to their home country and provide financial contributions (Al-Ali et al., 2001).  Cambodian 
diaspora associations that support universal jurisdiction cases against the Khmer Rouge have found it 
difficult to pursue lawsuits due to the daily concerns and pre-occupations of their volunteer diaspora 
staff (Mey, 2008). Mohamoud (2005) finds that African diasporas in the Netherlands have only recently 
become concerned with contributing to social change in Africa now that they have achieved a certain 
level of social and economic integration in their host country.    
 
Successful integration in the hostland can also have the reverse effect, however, of discouraging 
involvement with the country of origin.  Swain and Phan (2012) highlight that in some cases the 
economic, social and cultural assimilation of members of the diaspora can result in a decline in their 
interest in political issues affecting the homeland.  The effects can be more nuanced.  Valenta and 
Strabac (2011a) find in their study of Bosnian diasporas in Norway that while the integration of Bosnians 
in Norwegian mainstream society has contributed to a decline in organized transitional activities 
(through ethnic associations), it has facilitated greater individual transnational activity, including visits to 
the home country (p. 100). 
 
Diaspora participation in transitional justice and reconciliation: challenges and reflections 
 
The involvement of diasporas in transitional justice and reconciliation processes can be beneficial in 
terms of diaspora community relations and their process of coming to terms with past violence, abuses, 
and loss.  It can also be beneficial in terms of their contribution to peacebuilding in the home country.  
There are various potential challenges with their involvement, however, that need to be recognised and 
addressed. 
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A key challenge is how to deal with divergent perspectives between the diaspora and populations living 
in the country of origin on issues of peace and conflict, recovery strategies, transitional justice and 
reconciliation; and how to forge links between the populations.  The growing independence of some 
diasporas can lead to the development of interests, agendas and political opinions distinct from those of 
the local homeland population (Mey, 2008).  There were concerns during the establishment of Haiti’s 
truth commission, for example, that the Haitian diaspora community was approaching various aspects of 
the process in their own particular way (Quinn, 2009).  There were also divergences between members 
of the Bosnian diaspora and those living in Prijedor on the best way to approach the establishment of a 
memorial at the Omarska mine. 
 
The different contexts that diasporas experience living outside the home country may, as discussed, 
result in diasporas holding more nationalist, divisive views in some cases, or in other cases more 
reconciliatory views than those in the home country.  On a practical level, diaspora communities also 
have differing needs, for example, in the case of property restitution and reparations.  While it is 
important to survey the varying perspectives of the wider population affected by mass atrocity and to 
make the process as participatory as possible, it can be difficult to cater well to the needs and interests 
of distinct populations. 
 
Moreover, homeland populations may resent the input of the diaspora, particularly if they perceive 
them as having escaped much of the violence and suffering in the home country and living comfortably 
in the host countries (Smith, 2007; Mey, 2008).   Politicians in home countries can exacerbate such 
tension, as in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina where nationalist politicians have stirred up 
resentments toward those who left the country as refugees (Al-Ali et al., 2001).  Such behaviour also has 
the effect of deterring the transnational activities of diasporas.   
 
In the case of Sri Lanka, Orjuela (2008) finds that while nationalist organisations have created strong 
links with the diaspora, Sri Lankan peace organisations have not reached out to create similar links.  
Diaspora communities may also bypass organisations in the home country.  Cambodian diaspora victims 
associations that have filed lawsuits against members of the Khmer Rouge under universal jurisdiction 
have not established working relationships or contacts with local victims in Cambodia or with local 
associations that have been gathering testimony for years.  The lack of coordination and communication 
has resulted in duplication of efforts and different expectations and perceptions of the process between 
local victims and the diaspora (Mey, 2008). 
 
Collaborations between the diaspora and populations in the homeland are essential in addressing 
potential divergences in opinions between the communities and also to improve the effectiveness of 
transitional justice and reconciliation initiatives.  Diaspora and local organisations should coordinate 
their work to avoid working on the same projects in parallel and to ensure that actions are 
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complementary.  Where claims are filed under universal jurisdiction laws in host countries, for example, 
home country organisations could support such cases with evidence and testimony. This would also 
offer populations in the home country the chance to participate in trials and to be recognised as victims.  
Diaspora associations could focus on obtaining testimonies from the diaspora and raising awareness 
among the international community (Mey, 2008).  Where populations in the home country remain 
skeptical of the involvement of the diaspora, the home country could exercise leadership and coordinate 
diasporic activities (Smith, 2007). 
 
It is important to recognise that while some members of the diaspora will mobilize to engage in 
transitional justice and peacebuilding, there are many others who are unlikely to get involved on their 
own initiative.  In such cases, efforts could be made to specifically reach out to diaspora communities.  
While hostland migration and integration policies may allow the resources and capacity for diaspora to 
participate in initiatives concerning the homeland, this is not an automatic outcome.  Hostland 
initiatives, such as the provision of grants to fund homeland peacebuilding projects by diaspora 
organisations as has taken place in various European host countries, can be implemented to create 
incentives for such transnational activities.   
 
Homeland policies can also encourage diaspora engagement.  In Ghana, for example, returnees who 
have taken up positions of leadership as traditional chiefs have made trips overseas to establish contacts 
with diasporas (Kleist, 2011).  While these efforts have been focused primarily on soliciting economic 
investments in the home country, they could also be oriented toward participation in transitional justice 
and reconciliation processes.  The hearings that the Liberian truth commission held in the host countries 
enabled the participation of Liberian diaspora, particularly those who were unable to return to Liberia 
due to immigration status or insufficient resources; or those who would have been unwilling to make 
the emotional, physical and financial investment to return to the home country to take part. 
 
The engagement of the diaspora in transnational activities cannot be encouraged blindly, however.  If a 
diaspora community is deeply divided and conflict-oriented, then providing the space for members to 
influence the homeland could be de-stabilising.  In order to engage in informed interventions, it is 
important to assess the conditions of diaspora communities. Efforts should be made to address those 
that remain divided and nationalistic.  This is necessary for the healing of the diaspora communities 
themselves and also such that they can be transformed into a potential source of peace for the 
homeland.   In some cases, the participation of diasporas in transitional justice may be sufficient support 
for diasporas to move forward in processes of reconciliation.  In other cases, other initiatives, such as 
dialogue and media initiatives, aimed specifically at promoting such processes may be needed alongside. 
There is no question that diasporas are already actively involved in transitional justice, reconciliation and 
peacebuilding activities.  Much more research is required to capture what is taking place; to determine 
the best ways in which survivors in the conflict-generated diaspora can be heard; and to assess the 
attitudes and views of diasporas and how these affect relationships at all levels and perspectives on 
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homeland politics.  The aim should be to gain a better understanding of the roles of diaspora in 
transitional justice and reconciliation in the context of peacebuilding within diaspora communities and 
in the homeland.   Where initiatives are already in place to engage with the diaspora, it is essential to 
evaluate the various impacts of these efforts such that programmes can be designed more effectively 
and expanded upon to generate greater influence and impact.  Only then will it be possible to promote a 
more comprehensive peacebuilding that involves and reaches the global community of survivors of mass 
atrocity in the homeland and beyond.  
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